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Abstract
This study is the rst to attempt to isolate a relationship between cognitive activity
and equilibration to a Nash Equilibrium. Subjects, while undergoing fMRI scans of brain
activity, participated in second price auctions against a single competitor following pre-
determined strategy that was unknown to the subject. For this auction there is a unique
strategy that will maximize the subjects' earnings, which is also a Nash equilibrium of
the associated game theoretic model of the auction. As is the case with all games, the
bidding strategies of subjects participating in second price auctions most often do not
reect the equilibrium bidding strategy at rst but with experience, typically exhibit a
process of equilibration, or convergence toward the equilibrium. This research is focused
on the process of convergence.
In the data reported here subjects participated in sixteen auctions, after which all
subjects were told the strategy that will maximize their revenues, the theoretical equilib-
rium. Following that announcement, sixteen more auctions were performed. The question
posed by the research concerns the mental activity that might accompany equilibration as
it is observed in the bidding behavior. Does brain activation dier between equilibrated
and non-equilibrated in the sense of a bidding strategy? If so, are their dierences in
the location of activation during and after equilibration? We found signicant activation
in the frontal pole especially in Brodmann's area 10, the anterior cingulate cortex, the
amygdala and the basal forebrain. There was signicantly more activation in the basal
forebrain and the anterior cingulate cortex during the rst sixteen auctions than in the
second sixteen. The activity in the amygdala shifted from the right side to the left after
the solution was given.
JEL classication numbers: C91, D83, C23
Key words: auctions, strategy, imaging
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 The development of tools to measure reactions associated with mental activity 
opens the possibilities of fruitful interactions between economists and biologists, 
especially neuroscientists.  This study is the first to join that interface with a focus on 
equilibration.  Economic theory is typically a theory of equilibrium and equilibration for 
individuals, markets or, more generally, systems.  While both market models and game 
theory models have both equilibrium and equilibration defined in terms of observable 
variables, the theory itself, when applied to the individual, is often developed in terms of 
the unobservable beliefs and objectives that the individual might hold.  Thus, the theory 
is often developed from assumptions about unobservable states of mind along with the 
use of "as if" assumptions, to which theorists often resort when confronted by 
unobservables.   
The application of the resulting "as if" methodology is widespread, well 
understood and remarkably successful in developing models for the behavior of both 
individuals and complex systems of individuals.  Included are postulates of optimizing 
behavior and strategy, as well as postulates about the consequences of strategies that 
others might employ.  Intentions, attributions of intentions and strategic thinking, none of 
which can be observed, play a role in the theory.  At the base of the success of the theory, 
in spite of the lack of observability of key variables, rests a theory of equilibrium and 
equilibration.  It is that particular feature of this complex that we focus on here.  Can we 
observe mental activities that can be interpreted as equilibration that take place when 
observed choices would also be so interpreted? 
 Developments in the use of laboratory techniques in experimental economics 
together with the technological advancements of fMRI make possible collaboration 
between economics and neuroscience (Glimcher 2003, McCabe 2001) that might narrow 
the scope for speculation about what is taking place in the mind as economic decisions 
are made. 
Distinguishing between equilibrium behavior and out of equilibrium behavior 
could have important implications for the study of economics.  First, economic theory has 
little to say about behavior out of equilibrium.  Thus, observing behavior of individuals 
who are not equilibrated does not provide a valid test of the theory.  Knowing which data 
represent equilibrium behavior and which do not would be a significant breakthrough.  
The implications of commonly observed behavior that appears inconsistent with 
economic theory (Camerer, 1995), are quite different if the behavior is equilibrium 
behavior as opposed to confused responses of subjects searching for a solution (Plott, 
1996). 
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In this paper, we report the results of experiments conducted while subjects were 
inside a MRI scanner.  Subjects participated in a series of auctions in which the optional 
response is to accurately reveal preferences, which seem obvious once understood.  
Indeed, with training which sometimes includes explaining the optimal strategy, subjects 
typically adopt the strategy and in some cases do so only after a few trials.  In the 
experiments conducted, optimal and non-optimal strategies are easily observed and then 
can be used to distinguish between equilibrium and disequilibrium behavior. Such 
decisions are made while the subject is undergoing fMRI so the differences in mental 
process during and after equilibration can be observed  
 
2.  EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
The Task 
 The subject is given a coupon with a face value stated in the experimental 
currency called francs.  Francs were converted to dollars at the end of the experiment at a 
fixed known exchange rate (300f= $1).  The subject may keep the coupon and redeem it 
for cash at the end of the experiment or sell it and earn the sales price instead.  The 
subject’s task is to state a reservation price, i.e. the lowest price at which the subject is 
willing to sell the coupon.  That price will be compared with a bid randomly generated 
independently of the subject’s price.  If the random bid is above the reservation price, the 
subject sells the coupon at the higher price.  Otherwise the subject keeps the coupon.  The 
experimental task is based upon the method developed by Becker, De Groot and Marshak 
(1964) for determining subjects’ valuations of objects.  We refer to this procedure as 
BDM.  We used francs rather than direct cash values so that if we alter the design and 
change the number of tasks in a session the exchange rate can be adjusted to keep 
subjects earnings at a reasonable level.  In practice, subjects earned about $70 for the 
session, which ran about an hour and a half. 
If one wants to maximize rewards, the optimal strategy is to be "truthful" in the 
sense of bidding exactly the amount of the coupon.  Thus, if the subjects name an amount 
less than the value to them of the coupon, they risk selling it for less than the value.  On 
the other hand, if they name an amount that is more than the coupon is worth to them, 
there is the possibility of rejecting bids that they would prefer to having the coupon.  By 
naming any amount other than the true value of the coupon they cannot gain anything, 
but may lose something. 
Regardless of the simplicity, major elements of this problem are present in almost 
every economic decision.  First, is a notion of independence between subjects’ bids and 
the bids to which theirs will be compared.  If the bids are somehow related, then subjects 
would have an incentive to place bids with an objective of influencing the future bids 
used by the experimenter.  Secondly, there is a notion of optimizing behavior from the 
point of view of the subject, as opposed to the set of all bidders.  A subject who is 
concerned about being "fair" or concerned about appearance could behave much 
differently from theoretical predictions.  Third, is the recognition that one strategy is 
dominant: it is optimal regardless of the outcome of the randomness.  Recognition of 
dominance is an exercise in abstract logic that leads to the conclusion of the type of 
strategy that is optimal.  Such interactions among motive, understanding, logic, beliefs 
and strategy have always been a challenge to economists, who traditionally have only 
observed behaviors as data. 
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Subjects make sixteen bidding decisions and after each are informed of the 
amount of money they accumulate as a result.  After the first sixteen auctions, subjects 
were told the correct strategy, that is, the strategy that will ensure them the largest 
amount of money.  Instructions are attached in the Appendix.  These were read prior to 
any decision or experience in the machine.  Once in the machine, the screens they saw are 
typical of the example in Figure 1.  The Instructions about the optional strategy, which 
was after the first sixteen auctions, are attached at the end of the general instructions.  
The objective of the research reported here is to study the subjects while mental activity 
is taking place both before and after the instruction about strategy is given to them.  
Presumably, if the decisions of the subject are not equilibrated before the instruction is 
given to them, they would be so afterward.  The research questions we address are 
twofold.  What locations in the brain show activation in the task?  Are there systematic 




Subjects were recruited primarily from the upper level, undergraduate student 
population of University of California at San Diego.  However, the subjects did include 
graduate students, a postdoctoral fellow and a working adult.  Each subject was first 
given a safety orientation and, if willing, signed the consent form.  Next the subject read 
the Keypad Instructions for operating the specially designed non-metallic fiber optic 
BRU and then practiced with the BRU while seated in front of a laptop with the keypad 
to the right of the computer.  There are no metal parts that could cause interference.  The 
unit has four buttons that can be used to correspond to any four keys on the keyboard.  In 
these experimental sessions, the buttons on the BRU corresponded to: Left, Right, Up and 
Down.  Numbers were displayed on the screen as four digit numbers with all columns 
initialized at zero.  The Right (Left) button caused the cursor to move one column to the 
right (left) with a wrap around to the far left (right) if the cursor was already in the 
rightmost (leftmost) column.  The Up (Down) button increased (decreased) the digit in 
the active column by one.  All buttons had analogous wrap around features.  When the 
subject was comfortable with the BRU the subject was given the selling instructions.  At 
this point, any questions about the procedures were answered. 
 The subject was then positioned in the scanner with the BRU taped to the right 
side and the right arm taped on the BRU to alleviate the need to hold the arm still. The 
projected output from the laptop was aligned on a screen so that the subjects can see the 
information on the experimental tasks projected into the scanner.  Once the subject was 
properly placed in the scanner and able to read information displayed the subject is given 
a second practice session practice with the BRU under the new condition of lying down 
in the scanner.  As the positioning in the scanner takes several minutes and could be 
distracting, the instructions for the bidding task are summarized on a screen projected 
into the scanner (See Appendix instructions).  At this point, the experiment, which 
consists of four scanning session is conducted. 
Imaging was performed on a 1.5T Siemens magnet at the Thornton Hospital of 
UCSD.  The functional images consisted of 24 axial planes each 64 by 64.  Individual 
voxels were 45 cubic mm measuring 3 by 3 in plane and 5mm thick.  A custom program 
was written that alternately displayed a Bidding Task and a blank screen.  The program 
also reads the subject’s input from the BRU and records each keystroke, the time elapsed, 
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the bids and earnings.  The program includes a display calibration screen to align the 
projector and a Raw Display Program, which reads and displays the Raw Data 
(Supporting material).  
 
3.  THE STATISTICAL MODEL 
The data are panel data with the unit of observation being x (i, t), the hemodynamic 
response of voxel i at time t.  The basic model is (Rowe 2001, 2003): 
(1) x(i,t) = a(i) + b(i)*t  + c(i,1)*S(1,t) + . . . +c(i,k)*S(k,t) + ε(i,t) . 
In the equation, the S (k, t) are the values of k possibly unobserved stimuli often called 
reference functions that the voxels are responding to.  Each voxel has its own intercept 
and trend as well as coefficients for contributions from the k responses to the stimuli or 
reference functions.  We take the disturbances, ε (i, t) to be matrix normal with 
contemporaneous covariance matrix Ψ and uncorrelated over time. 
If the reference functions are unobserved, the model is similar to a factor analysis 
model.  In factor analysis it is usually assumed that the factors (reference functions in this 
application) are orthogonal.  We do not impose that condition here, so the model is 
perhaps better described as a latent variable model.  
We proceed in a Bayesian fashion, and quantify available knowledge in the form 
of priors for the models parameters.  The regression coefficients are taken to be jointly 
normal with covariance matrix Ψ, and mean matrix C0.  The reference functions are taken 
to be matrix normal with prior mean S0, the columns of which are the assumed to be 
boxcar functions representing the experimental treatments, and covariance matrix R.  
Usual practice is to estimate differences in response by introducing the boxcar functions 
(so-called due to their shape) taking the value 1 during a treatment and -1 or 0 when the 
treatment is not on, shifting them to allow for the hemo-dynamic lag and smoothing or 
tapering them to reduce discontinuities.  The Bayesian approach allows the data to 
determine the shape of the reference functions.  For a fuller discussion, see Rowe (2000, 
2001).  For an elementary but elegant discussion of Bayesian inference see Edwards, 
Lindman and Savage (1963).  The variance covariance matrices, Ψ and R, are taken to 
have inverted Wishart distributions with parameters (ν, Q) and (η, V) respectively.  The 
number of components was initially taken to be one.  Later we considered the possibility 
of two reference functions and assumed that each of the two possible values of k (the 
number of functions) had prior probability of one half.  We use an empirical Bayes 
approach and take the prior means for the coefficients of the reference functions to be the 
estimated coefficients of the voxels’ activations on boxcar.  We obtain the conditional 
densities of the parameters given the values of the other parameters and the hyper 
parameters.  We estimate the mode of the posterior distribution by the method of iterated 
conditional modes (see Lindley and Smith (1972) and Rowe (2001) for details), and we 
obtain our estimates of the reference function (s) from the posterior mode.  We proceed 
conditional upon the reference functions that we estimated from the mode of the posterior 
distribution.  That is, we look at the relationship between the hemodynamic responses in 
voxels and the statistically determined Bayesian reference functions, using the Bayesian 
reference functions in place of the boxcar functions. 
The procedures for calculating the statistical significance of the activation were 
based on the AFNI program and related software.  For each scan, we computed the 
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histogram of the t statistics for the full brain and picked the value that corresponded to a 
fixed percentile of the distribution (typically 95 %).  We defined regions of interest 
(ROIs) prior to the analysis, and only used regions we could identify without reference to 
activation maps.  For the frontal pole, for example, we took to all of the brain forward of 
minus 55 (Talairach) on the y-axis.  We identified all clusters of voxels in ROIs such that 
at each voxel in the cluster the t statistic was at least as large as the cut off level.  Voxels 
were defined as being in the same cluster if their centers were no more than 5.7mm apart.  
We calculated the bandwidths of the Gaussian filter corresponding to the spatial 
correlations in the data using the program 3dFWHM.  We simulated the clusters in the 
ROIs using areas of roughly the same configurations as the ROIs.  In the simulations 
samples of independent standard normal variables are generated and smoothed with the 
Gaussian filter estimated from the data.  Each simulation was preformed 10,000 times 
and the number of clusters tabulated by size of cluster.  Rather than perform separate 
simulations for each scan, we performed the simulations using the maximal bandwidths 
from the four scans for each subject.  As larger bandwidths lead to more clusters this 
procedure is conservative. 
The procedures for calculating the differences in activation were similar.  The 
time series for scans one and two were added and the series for scans three and four 
subtracted from them.  The statistical model was then fit using the average overall 
subjects and scans of the Bayesian components as the functions in equation (1).  Once 
these calculations were performed, the methods were the same as those described. 
 
4.  RESULTS 
The results are partitioned into two subsections.  The first is found in the daily 
behavior as viewed from the point of view of economics.  The second subsection is 
related to mental activity as rendered from the fMRI.  
Bidding Results 
The task is one that we believed subjects would spend some time trying to find 
the correct strategy and, then, would spend the rest of the trials using the optimal strategy.  
Previous experiments suggested the task we chose.  The purpose was to observe activity 
during a non-equilibrated period and a subsequent equilibrated period.  The first result of 
this section demonstrates that equilibration processes, as seen by economic theory, were 
observed on average.  Table 1 shows the time structure of absolute difference between 
bid and the value of the ticket for each subject.  Compared are the first sixteen auctions 
with the last sixteen.  Equilibration occurs when the difference is zero.  For no subject is 
the median lower in the first sixteen and for most it is higher.  The data can be viewed a 
different way in Figure 2.  Shown there are the eight bids for each subject during each of 
the four sessions plotted against the value of the ticket for which the subject was bidding.  
Equilibrium theory predicts that all bids should lie on the 45 degree line.  Subjects were 
told the equilibrium strategy at the start of the third series of eight.  The equilibration 
tendencies are obvious in the data. 
 
RESULT 1:  Overall, subjects exhibited convergence to the equilibrium strategy with 
more rapid convergence exhibited after the domination features of the equilibrium 
strategy were explained. 
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 SUPPORT.  Each of the 17 subjects participated in 32 auctions, producing a total of 544 
bids.  Of these, 241 were exactly equal to the value of the coupon.  There were 75 bids 
equal to coupon value in the first 16 trials and 166 during the second 16 trials.  All 
coupon values and the predetermined bids were in multiples of ten (subjects were not told 
this).  Thus, any bid within 10 of the coupon value earned the same amount as bidding 
the value exactly.  More bids, mainly from the second 16 trials (203 compared to 108) 
satisfied this criterion.  The magnitudes of the differences were not large in general.  
Averaging over all subjects, the average differences were 42.3 points for the first eight 
trials and 47.9 for the second eight trials.  The differences for the second half of the 
session were much smaller:  0.5 points for the last eight trials and 9.1 for the third eight 
(ignoring one outlier at 9000).• 
 The figure illustrates the existence of variability across subjects.  One concern 
was that the task would be so obvious to the subjects that they would see the solution 
immediately and indeed for some subjects that was the case as is summarized by the next 
result and support. 
 
RESULT 2:  Convergence properties differ across the behavior of individuals. 
 
SUPPORT.  Of the seventeen subjects who participated in scans, four nearly always used 
the dominant strategy from the very beginning (subjects 2, 4, 6 and 11).  An additional 
three subjects (subjects 3, 9 and 14) converged to the dominant strategy without being 
told for a total of seven subjects that consistently used the dominant strategy without 
being given the solution.  In addition, seven subjects followed the correct strategy after 
being given the solution.  Even after being given the solution, subjects frequently 
experimented a bit before adopting the dominant strategy.  All but three subjects adopted 
the dominant strategy by the end of the experiment (two consistently priced over the 
value and one priced below).  Initial behavior, however, was heterogeneous.  Six subjects 
began by pricing over the value, three consistently set prices below the value, four gave 
prices both over and under the value and four used the dominant strategy from the 
beginning.• 
 The source of the observed variablity differs from individual to individual and 
during the first phases appears to be related to strategic behavior based on 
misunderstandings or confusion about the full implication of various strategies.  The 
misguided strategy seems to come in two forms.  Some individuals place a higher bid 
believing they will receive a higher price not realizing that in a second price auction they 
are exposed to an opportunity for loss.  Other subjects offer at low prices explaining the 
strategy by saying that they wanted to make the sale.  Both properties can be seen in the 
first panels of Figure 2.  Notice two separate groupings of data, one with a tendency to be 
above the 45° line of the optimal strategy and the other much below the line.  On average, 
there was a greater tendency to over bid with 205 prices set above coupon value and 95 
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set below.5  Notice that in the lower panels the two groups have merged into one as 
subjects tended to adopt the optional strategy.  
Those subjects who did not adopt the dominant strategy of giving the coupon 
value as their reservation price seemed to adopt some simple alternative e.g. rounding up 
the coupon value to the next multiple of 100, or alternating above and below.  One 
subject alternated by being over the coupon value by 30 points and by under 70 points. 
A scanner is hardly an ideal decision making environment.  The subjects are 
motionless on their backs and in a tube looking at a screen through mirrored glasses.  The 
button response unit (BRU) is taped to them, and the scanner, when active, makes a lot of 
noise.  Given this, the overall performance is reasonable.  Pilot experiments with subjects 
who were not in scanners exhibited similar convergence. 
 
Results from fMRI: Mental Activity Measurements 
The brain areas activated in these experiments include the frontal polar cortex, 
which is known from previous studies to be involved in calculation, and a group of brain 
structures that receive input from the dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain that signal 
expectation of reward.  These structures include the basal forebrain, the amgdala and the 
anterior cingulate cortex.   
Two additional results emerge from the brain scans.  The first of these (Result 3) 
identify the location in which significant activities were observed.  The second (Result 4) 
summarizes the changes in mental activity across the treatments.   
Each subject participated in four sets of bids each eight minutes and thirty-two 
seconds long.  The sequence was twenty-two seconds during which the value of the 
coupon was displayed (see supporting materials for the display) and the subject entered 
their reservation price, ten seconds for feedback, followed by thirty-two seconds of blank 
screen.  For technical reasons we were unable to analyze the MRI data from the first 6 
subjects; the analysis is based on subject 7 through 17. 
 
RESULT 3.  Significant activation occurs in four areas: the frontal pole (especially 
Brodmann's Area 10), the amygdala, the anterior cingulate cortex and the basal forebrain. 
 
SUPPORT.  The activations are summarized in Table 2.  The table gives the estimated 
significance levels for the largest cluster of voxels in the indicated regions all of which 
exceeded a predetermined cutoff level. Frequently, there were multiple clusters found 
which were significant at conventional levels of significance.  The significance levels 
shown are, therefore, conservative.  As stated above, the anterior cingulate activity was 
greater in the first sixteen auctions, which is shown in Figure 3, a sagittal view (at x=0) 
depicting the difference between the intensity over the first 16 rounds minus rounds 17-
32.  The right amygdala was more active in the first 16 rounds than the left (see Figure 
4).• 
                                                 
5 Explanation of the tendency to over bid involves some controversy.  Kahneman, Knitsch and Thaler 
(1991) interpret this as an inducement effort”, on the other hand Plott and Zeiler (2003) suggest that it 
results from subject’s misunderstandings of the task. 
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 RESULT 4.  Activation levels changed over the course of the treatments.  The anterior 
cingulate activity was greater during the first (during theoretical equilibration) trials as 
was the right amygdala.  During the second sixteen trials (after theoretical equilibration), 
amygdalar activity shifted to the left side and the anterior cingulate activity reduced.  
 
SUPPORT.  The right amygdala was more active in the first 16 rounds than the left (see 
Figure 2).  In the final rounds, the amygdalar activity shifted to the left side.  Table 3 
gives the significance levels for the differences in the responses between the first two 
scans (before subjects were given the solution to the problems) and the last two scans 
(after the solution was given).  Table 4 contains the same information for the scans 
immediately before and after subjects were given the solution (scans 2 and 3).  In the 
tables we report significance levels for the largest clusters of each sign (a minus sign 
indicates the cluster is significant with a negative sign indicating greater activation in the 
later scans) and the centers of mass of the clusters (weighted by intensity).• 
 
5.  DISCUSSION 
The results reported here suggest the existence of a correspondence between the 
phenomenon of equilibration in decision rules as it is interpreted by economic theory and 
the physiological traces of mental processing.  Such a correspondence holds a potential 
for joining two sciences in useful ways.  On one hand, as already noted, a concept of 
equilibrium is central to much of economic theory.  The theory interprets behavior "as if" 
certain mental processes were taking place and introspection about those processes often 
serves to motivate new theory.  In the absences of direct observations of mental activity, 
competing interpretations of observed behavior are difficult to resolve.  For example, an 
individual who is confused and exhibits unchanging behavior while resolving a decision 
problem could be interpreted as having attained equilibrium.  Furthermore, measurements 
of behavior tend to be limited to those that are suggested by the theory, which is itself 
conditioned on an assumption that mental processes cannot be observed.  Thus, for 
economics the discovery suggests the possibility of enriching the set of observable 
variables that might be interpreted by theory.  Similarly, on the other hand, the discovery 
connects neuroscience with a new set of behaviors and suggests new interpretations of 
the areas of the brain in which mental activities are taking place.  
The task was chosen so that we expected to image brain activity during a non-
equilibrated or searching stage and after equilibration.  To this end, the task was not 
perfect.  If a subject happens to adopt the equilibrium strategy, by accident or without 
realizing that it is indeed a correct strategy, there was no way no way to tell.  In our 
experiment, for example, it is possible that subjects could respond with the face value of 
the coupon because it is a salient number and not because they had determined that this 
was in fact the best possible response.  Though a few subjects adopted the optimal 
strategy without being given the solution, all subjects were given the optimal strategy 
after the first two scans.  We do not know if those subjects using the optimal strategy 
before getting the solution actually understood the task rather than responding with the 
coupon value as a focal point.   
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With the qualifications as above, we conservatively identify observations from the 
second two scans as being equilibrated and those from the first two as being non-
equilibrated.  In this regard, we see more activation during the first two scans in the 
anterior cingulate and the right amygdala than during the later scans.  Thus, we interpret 
the phenomena of disequilibration with the anterior cingulate, which dampens with the 
process of equilibration.  The findings and interpretation are consistent with other 
findings reported in the literature.   
The strongest and most consistent activation was located near the frontal pole, 
primarily in Brodmann’s area 10 (Table 5).  This area has been previously been found to 
be active in other tasks involving monetary reward and risk assessment (Rogers et al., 
1999; Ernst et al., 2001).  Area 10 is also activated in mental calculation (Rickard, 2000) 
which the subjects would have been performing in this task.  Area 10 is activated when 
an expected financial reward is received (Knutson, et al. 2003).  Area 10 is both 
absolutely and relatively much larger in humans than in other primates which suggests 
that some of the circuitry related to economic decision-making is a phylogenetic 
specialization in the human brain (Allman et al., 2002; Semendeferi et al., 2001).   
The anterior cingulate cortex, basal forebrain, and amygdala all receive strong 
dopaminergic input from the midbrain, which signals the expectation of reward (Schultz, 
2002).  The anterior cingulate was active during the first 16 auctions before the subjects 
were told the optimal bidding strategy and less active during the second 16 auctions.  The 
anterior cingulate cortex is active in difficult tasks involving considerable uncertainty 
(Critchley, et al. 2001).  The anterior cingulate cortex is also active in tasks the require 
novel as opposed to routine solutions (Raichle et al, 1994).  The anterior cingulate cortex 
is the source of an EEG signal associated with financial loss in gambling (Gehring and 
Willoughby, 2002), which would presumably not occur with the application of the 
optimal bidding strategy.  More broadly speaking, the anterior cingulate cortex is 
involved in maintaining physiological homeostasis through the regulation of a wide 
variety of mechanisms necessary for life including hunger and thirst.  (Liotti, et al. 2001).  
This broader view of a homeostatic role for anterior cingulate is consistent with the lack 
of activation in these structures during economic decision making during equilibrium 
conditions.  
The basal forebrain contains many reward-related neurons (Schultz, 2000).  
Activity in the ventral striatal component of the basal forebrain is specifically related to 
cumulative financial reward during a series of gambles (Elliott et al., 2003).  The 
amygdala is strongly associated with fear (Ledoux, 1995) and it is possible that the initial 
activation on the right side during the disequilibrium phase may have arisen from the 
subjects’ fear of financial loss.  However, the activation of the left amygdala during the 
second sixteen auctions after the subjects had been informed of the optimal strategy may 
be associated with their increased certitude of receiving financial reward.  There is 
increasing evidence that amygdala is involved in positive reward assessment as well as its 
more familiar role in fear (Baxter and Murray, 2002; Schultz, 2002).  Recently, Fried et 
al., (2001) have shown through micro dialysis that the dopaminergic input to the 
amygdala in human subjects increases during cognitive tasks not involving fear. 
The fact that the location of neural activity changes as equilibration takes place 
means that in imaging studies, equilibration and time must be considered in addition to 
features of the task.  Clearly there is much to be done.  In pilot studies, we included 
control tasks, simple calculations requiring response on the BRU, and found that subjects 
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were distracted by the second task, forgetting their experience in the earlier auctions.  
Thus, we did not include control tasks because of the expected interference in subjects’ 
finding the optimal strategy in the selling task.  A natural extension would be to bring 
subjects back after a few days to redo the task.  Assuming that they then understand the 
task, we could use these extra trials to compare their now (presumed to be) equilibrated 
behavior with the scans from the earlier sessions.  At this time it should be able to 
introduce other control tasks. 
 The task studied involves numerical responses.  While this is true of many 
economic decisions, it is by no means true of all.  Choices from non-numerically valued 
alternatives are basic to economics, and could also be studied.  The task studied has a 
single individual acting alone with alternative bids predetermined by a computer.  
Bargaining, or any type of other regarding behavior is not included in the situation 
studied.  A natural extension would be to have subjects buying and selling in markets 
with other participants. 
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Table: 1 Absolute Value of the Bid minus the Value of the Ticket  
 
 Auctions 1 to 16 Auctions 17 to 32 








1 419.1 111.5 399 0 388 94.2 0 13 
2 .1 .3 0 16 .2 .5 0  16 
3 83.9 92.0 65 5 5.9 4.4 5 14 
4 23.3 84.5 1 15 1 0  1 16 
5 73.8 76.3 60 1 59.4 24.9 60 0 
6 0.0 0.0  0 16 0 0 0 16 
7 379.2 145.5 400 1 0 0 0 16 
8 187.3 97.9 210 0 15.7 28.0 5 11 
9 14.1 30.1 0 12 0 0 0 16 
10 78.8 35.8 80 1 580 2245.6 0 126 
11 6.3 3.6 0 16 0 0 0 16 
12 31.9 29.9 25 5 25.0 30.6 10 8 
13 263.0 161.7 278 1 129.7 125.9 95 2 
14 29.4 55.4 7.5 9 0 0 0 16 
15 51.6 22.5 50 0 50 26.7 50 0 
16 91.9 107.0 61.5 3 0 0 0 16 
17 167.1 224.4 17 7 53.8 215.0 0 15 
 
                                                 
6  Deleting one observation at 9000 reduces the mean and standard deviation to 18.7 and 38.9, respectively.  
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 Table 2 
Significance Levels of Responses for the Four Scans 
 

















          7 a a c a 
a c d c 
 a a a a 
d a - b 
- - - a 
 
c d 
- - - d 
 
          8 a b a c 
a a a b 
- - d 
b 
a a a a 
b b a 
b b b c 
c - b 
 
- a 
          9 c d b d 
- a a a 
- c 
- a a  
a a a a 
a a - a 
- c  
- a c  
b - a c 
c - c a 
         10 a a a a 
a c a a 
c b a d 
- c - b 
c a a a 
- a a a 
- - d b 
- a b a 
a b 
- a 
         11 c a a a 
a a a a 
 b a d c 
d - d b 
a a b c 
a c c a 
 
 
         12 a a a a 
a a a a 
a - - b 
a - b 
a - - c 
a b a d 
b - b  
- c  
b - c 
c - c 
         13 a a a a 
a c a a 
- a d 
- - a 
- b 




- c - c 
         14 a a a a 
a a a a
- c - a 
- - b a
- - a a 
- d a a
  
- - - b
         15 c a a 




c a c a
- c c 
c - a c
 
         16 a a a a 
a a a a 
- - a - a - b 
c a d 
c - a 
 
- - a 
         17 a a a 
b a a a 
a 
- a a a 
a b - c 
a d a a 
 
 
d - c 
- - d 
 
 
The letters in each cell give the significance levels for the four scans in order. 
The first row gives significance levels for  the first component, and the second row gives 
significance levels for the second component.  
Legend: a  p<.0005; b  p<.005; c  p<.05; d  p<0.1; blank or -  p>.10 
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Table 3 
Response Scans 1&2 minus 3& 4 
Differences computed for each voxel 
First Component 
 
Subject Frontal pole Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex 
Basal Forebrain Amygdala 
 7        a, a-                        b-       c 
 8        a                        a       a 
 9        a,a-             d           a,a-        
10        a,a-                        a-       a 
11        a-                        a-        
12        a,a-             a           c        
13        a,a-             b           a        
14                                        
15        a                                
16        a,a-                                
17        a,a-            b                   
Second Component 
 
Subject Frontal pole Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex 
Basal Forebrain Amygdala 
 7        a,a-                    
 8        c                                
 9                     c           a        
10        a,a-                        a-        
11        a,a-                        a        
12        a,a-            a,a-           b,a-       a- 
13        a,a-                        a           
14        a,a-             a-                   
15        a-                                
16                      
17        c, a-                                
 
Legend: a    p<.0005;   b    p<.005; c    p< .05;   d    p< .10 
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Table 4 
Response Scan 2 minus Scan 3 
Differences computed for each voxel 
First Component 
 
Subject Frontal pole Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex 
Basal Forebrain Amygdala 
 7        c                        a        
 8        a                                
 9        b,c-             d           d,a-       b 
10        a,a-                                
11        a                        a        
12        a,a-                        a-        
13        a,a-                        a        
14                                        
15        a,a-                                
16                                        
17        a,a-            a           a        
Second Component 
 
Subject Frontal pole Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex 
Basal Forebrain Amygdala 
 7        a,            a       a 
 8        a                        a       b,b- 
 9                     a                   
10        a,a-                        a,a-        
11        a,a-                        a-        
12        a-                       a-        
13        c-                                  d 
14        a,a-                        a,a-       a 
15        a,a-                                
16        a,a-              
17        d, a-             a-           c-        
 
Legend: a    p<.0005;   b    p<.005; c    p< .05;   d    p< .10 
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Table 5 
Area 10 Significant Activation 
 
 Component 1  Component 2 
 
Scan      1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 
Subject 7    • 
a 
     
 8       • 
a, a 
  
 9   • 
 

























































































































A dot indicates that part of Area 10 is contained in a cluster that is significant 
at the level indicated based on simulations of clusters in the frontal pole.  
Legend:  p<.0005;   b    p<.005; c    p< .05;   d    p< .10 
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Figure 2.  Pooled Bids of all Individuals




Average response for the first 16 rounds minus the average for rounds 17-32. Note the 








Average response for the first 16 rounds minus the average for rounds 17-32.  Note the 
activity is greater on the right amygdala in for the first 16 rounds , and shifts to the  left 




This is an experiment in decision-making.  During the experiment you will 
be asked to do several repetitions of a selling task.  The experiment will 
consist of a series of rounds.  In each round, you will perform the task once.  
The amount of money you earn will depend upon the decisions you make. 
 
Our purpose is to study various technical issues involved in decision-making 




The selling task works as follows. You will receive a coupon worth money 
to you.  You may keep the coupon and collect the money or you can sell the 
coupon to the experimenter.  Your task is to choose a selling price for the 
coupon and enter it with the keypad. 
 
Your selling price is compared to an offer price randomly generated by the 
computer.  The price chosen by the computer is completely unrelated to your 
coupon value or your price. 
 
The sale is best described as an auction but it is much different from any 
auction you have seen before.  
 
If the computer’s randomly generated offer price is higher than (or the same 
as) your selling price, then you sell the coupon at the computer’s offer price.  
For example, if your selling price is 900, and the computer’s offer price is 
1000, then the experimenter buys from you at a price of 1000. 
 
If the computer’s offer price is below your selling price, then the 
experimenter does not buy from you.  You would keep the coupon and 
collect its value.   
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If the computer’s random offer price is more than your value of the coupon 
you would prefer to sell the coupon. 
 
If the computer’s random offer price is less than your value of the coupon 




Money and Sequence 
After you have completed each task the screen will display your earnings 
from the particular task and your accumulated total earnings.  You will be 
paid  _____ of the accumulated total earnings.  (For technical reasons the 
numbers used in the experiment are a multiple of the actual money.)  After 
earnings are displayed the screen will go blank for a while and then the next 
task will be shown. 
 
In order to assure you that the computer’s offer prices are completely 
unrelated to your offer price or your value of the item, the computer’s offers 
have been previously generated.  These offer prices are listed in the envelope 
you have been given. If you want, after the experiment you will be able to 
verify this independence by comparing the list to the offer prices displayed 






Points to remember: 
1.  You enter the lowest price that you are willing to offer the coupon for.  
2.  If your offer is the same or higher than the computer's offer, you keep 
the coupon. If your offer is lower, then you sell it at the higher 
price. 
3. If the computer's offer is higher than  
the coupon value, you make more money selling.  




Summary of instructions show to subjects after they were positioned in the scanner 
 
The way to make the most money in the experiment is 
to set your offer price equal to the value of the coupon. 
 
If you do this, then you will never sell the coupon for 
less than what it will pay at the end of the experiment. 
 
Also, you will never reject a chance to sell the coupon 
for more than it will pay. 
 
The program will restart now.  Your earnings will be added  
to what you have earned so far. 
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Message shown to subjects after they had completed the first sixteen auctions. 
